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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
LAW QUARTERLY
Volume 1970 Fall, 1970 Number 4
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD-IMPLEMENTER OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR POLICY OR VICE VERSA?*
OWEN FAIRWEATHER**
U.S. managements bargain with unions that have grown during the
last 35 years to become the most powerful in the world. The Supreme
Court said recently, that Unions have come of age and hence the
national labor policy should no longer emphasize "the protection of the
nascent labor movement," but rather "the encouragement of collective
bargaining and administrative techniques for the peaceful resolution of
industrial disputes."'
The alternative to free collective bargaining as the process by which
employee wages and benefits are established in the private sector is
their establishment by governmentally sponsored tribunals-an
alternative that most people do not want. 2
* Based on a paper presented to the Missouri Bar Association at St. Louis, September 25,
1970.
** Partner, Seyfarth. Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, Chicago, Illinois.
1. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local No. 770, 398 U.S. 235, 257 (1970).
2 The process of seeking an alternative to bargaining usually starts with a proposal for
advisory fact-finding by a governmentally appointed tribunal and ends with a third party
determination of wage and benefits that the employer must provide. When these are determined,
governmental determination of prices, and hence profit levels, inevitably follows. The railroad
industry managements now believe that advisory fact-finding under the National Railway Labor
Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1954) merely establishes a high bargaining floor, thereby increasing
the bargaining strength of the railroad unions, and they believe binding third party determination
would be preferable. See Address by Daniel P. Loomis, Pacific Coast Transportation Institute,
BNA DAILY LAB. RPT. No. 96, May 15, 1963. See also Nixon Message Concerning Proposed
Legislation on National Emergency Disputes in Transportation, BNA DAILY LAB. RPT. No. 40,
Feb. 27, 1970.
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If free collective bargaining is to prevail, it must be a procedure
which generally produces settlements of employee-employer contests
over wage and benefits levels which are compatible with the interests
of the public.
Secretary of Labor James Hodgson has identified one segment of
industry where collective bargaining is in disrepair. He said that
construction settlements "are consistently double national wage
movement patterns-the result is bad news-bad news to the economy
and bad news for the industry."' 3 The standard he used to identify
disrepair in collective bargaining is disproportionately high settlements
due to distortions in the relative bargaining strength of the contesting
parties.4
The claim that collective bargaining is in disrepair is also made when
the level of settlements is so high that it cannot be absorbed by
improvements in productivity and must be reflected in increases in
prices. The annual increases in earnings since 1968 have been more
than double the rate of plant productivity improvement. When this
happens, the standard of living of working people does not rise. In fact,
the factory worker has been sliding into an economic hole. In 1965, the
average worker earned a gross pay of $107.53 per week, equal to $88.06
in real income when adjusted to 1957-1959 dollars, but by May of 1970
his gross pay was $133.67, equal to a real income of only
$86.07-lower than it was five years before.5
3. Speech by Secretary of Labor, James Hodgson to the Labor Relations Law Section of the
American Bar Association, Collective Bargaining Today: A Potomac Perspective, BNA DAILY
LAB. RPr. No. 155, August I1, 1970.
4. The building trades, which include eighteen unions with nearly three million members
in 10,000 locales, are able to . . .control the labor supply and have created an artificial
labor shortage. Taking advantage of the industry's fragmentation, they have used that
shortage to push up. . .wages. . . faster than manufacturing and other industrial wages.
Recently the pace of the increase has been accelerating. In 1968, wage increases of
1,254,000 construction workers under collective-bargaining contracts averaged close to 8
percent for the first year of the contract; last year the rate jumped to 14 percent; in the
first half of 1970, according to Labor Department figures, the 'mean adjustment' was 17.1
percent. In many instances, wages were slated to double in the next three years.
Burch, The Building Trades v. the People. FORTuNE, October 1970, at 95. These high settlements
in construction are contributing to the general cost-push inflation by establishing inappropriate
bargaining targets for other union leaders, reducing the standard of housing working people can
afford, and increasing the taxes such people must pay to build needed schools, roads and public
buildings.
5. Part of the wage increases from 1965 to 1970 were going for higher federal and social
security taxes, but the rest has been swallowed by inflation. In construction, the workers enjoyed
a real income gain. In 1965, construction workers' gross weekly income was $138.38, equal to a
real income of $111.48; in May, 1970, gross weekly income was $194.44, equal to a real income of
$122.76.
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When price increases are being forced by exorbitant wage and benefit
settlements (substantially greater than productivity improvement),
many contend that wage controls should be established by the
government.' Wage controls, of course, mean a giant step away from
free enterprise toward a controlled economy; and President Nixon has
said that wage and price controls should be contemplated only as a
"last resort appropriate only in an extreme emergency such as all-out
war."
7
This means we intend to rely generally on free collective bargaining
as the process to regulate wage and benefit levels. However, if free
collective bargaining is to be the regulator, it must produce settlements
that permit real incomes to rise rather than settlements which fuel an
inflation which will cause serious economic hardship. When collective
bargaining is evaluated as a regulator, the bargaining strength of the
employer is as important as the bargaining strength of unions, because
unless employers generally have sufficient power to keep the rate at
which wage and benefit levels rise somewhat compatible with the rate
at which productivity improves, prices will rise; and, if prices rise too
rapidly, injurious inflation results.
To minimize the economic harm caused by cost-push inflation,
managers should be encouraged to introduce more efficient machines
and more productive procedures, referred to as the rate of productivity
improvement, as fast as they practically can. If the rate of productivity
improvement is maintained at the highest practical level, the maximum
amount of the earnings rise will be absorbed in cost reductions and the
least amount will be reflected in price increases -reducing the cost-push
inflation effect of the annual increases.8
That the maintenance of a high rate of productivity improvement
should be an important part of our national labor policy was
underscored by President Nixon when he said as he announced the
establishment of the National Commission on Productivity: 9
6 For example, Senator Fred Harris proposed a board with power to impose a freeze on wages
and prices. BNA Daily Lab. Rpt. No. 36, Feb. 20, 1970, A-4.
7 BNA DAILY LAB. RP-r. No. 160, August 18, 1970, A-16.
8 Since 1967, the unit labor cost in manufacturing has been rising, which means the increase
in plant productivity has not been sufficient to absorb the wage increases, or, stated the other
way, the wages have been increasing at a faster rate than productivity. The unit labor cost index
increased between August and September, 1970, 3.2% and was then 8% higher than in September,
1969. In 1967, by contrast, the index rose only 2.5%. BNA DAILY LAB. RPT. No. 210, October
28, 1970, B-1.
9 BNA DAILY LAB. RPr. No. 117, June 17, 1970.
Vol. 1970: 389]
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In order to achieve price stability, healthy growth and a rising standard
of living, we must find ways of restoring growth to productivity.
** *
In general, productivity is a measure of how well we use our resources;
in particular, it means how much real value is produced by an hour of
work. In the past two years productivity has increased far less than
usual.
We must achieve a balance between costs and productivity that will lead
to more stable prices.
Hence, if, as the Supreme Court says, our national labor policy
should be designed to encourage free collective bargaining, it must
contain these two elements:
(1) The avoidance of governmentally induced artificial shifts in the
power balance between the contesting parties, which might result in
settlements at levels incompatible with the public interest; 0 and,
(2) The encouragement of the highest practical rate of productivity
improvement in production enterprise to absorb the maximum amount
of the cost impact of annual wage and benefit improvements."'
If this is true, the National Labor Relations Board should fashion
10. Some thoughtful observers contend that free collective bargaining cannot function as a
regulator in a manner compatible with the public interest unless union power is curtailed. See C.
LINDBLOM, UNIONS AND CAPITALISM (1949); Ltrz, INDUSTRY WIDE COLLEcTIvE BARGAINING:
PROMISE PR MENACE (1950); R. POUND, LEGAL IMMUNITIES OF LABOR UNIONS AND PUBLIC
POLICY 122 (1958); D. RICHBERG, LABOR UNION MONOPOLY (1957); WOLMAN, MONOPOLY
POWER AS EXERCISED BY LABOR UNIONS (1957); Chamberlin, Economic Analysis of Labor
Union Power, in LABOR UNIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY 1 (1958); Roman, Labor Unions,
Intimidation and Monopoly, 65 CoM. L.J. 98 (1960). See also a legislative proposal, S. 2573,
87th Cong., Ist Sess. (1961). Hence, the first element of a national labor policy designed to protect
free collective bargaining [identified as (1) above] which does not contemplate any diminution of
union bargaining strength is a most modest policy standard against which to evaluate the past
and current decisional process of the Board. On the other hand, when strikers are made eligible
for poor relief payments from state funds, the state is intervening in the contest and changing
the power balance. If it is proper for strikers to obtain this relief from the economic hurt of the
strike, employers should be able to have the state pay interest charges during the strike period.
11. Exporting products makes jobs at home and aids in the maintenance of a sound balance
of payments. Hence, increasing exports and decreasing imports should be a national policy
objective. An increase will only occur if the rate of wage cost rise moderates and the rate of
productivity increases. Robert W. Roosa, formerly Undersecretary for Monetary Affairs,
explained:
The only sure way to re-establish strength in the balance of payments is to increase the
country's ability to compete.. . . The primary need . . . is an upward shift in the rate
of investment-investment that can raise productivity, lower costs, and in general give a
new thrust to the competition potential of American business.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1970/iss4/1
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the law which it develops in its pattern of decisions in a manner that
is consistent with these two elements of policy. However, an
examination of Board decisions in recent years suggests that the Board
has not been fashioning the law in a manner consistent with these two
elements needed to protect free collective bargaining, but rather on the
assumption that our national labor policy is still the protection of a
fledgling labor movement and maximization of union bargaining
power--objectives which the Supreme Court says are now outmoded.
If the two simple elements of national labor policy set forth above
are essentials and free collective bargaining is to function as a
regulator, it should then be determined whether the decisional process
of the National Labor Relations Board can still implement them or
whether the law developed by the Board emphasizing a different policy
objective has been so hardened that legislative change would be needed
to redirect the development of the law.
Those who worry whether the Board will implement or block these
two simple elements of national labor policy breathed a sigh of relief
on August 29 of last year as they read the majority opinion in Ex-Cell-
0.12 The Trial Examiner had found that Ex-Cell-O had refused to
bargain because it wanted to obtain a court review of certain election
procedures, a review that could only be obtained by an appeal of a
refusal to bargain determination by the Board. However, because of the
delay the appeal would cause in the commencement of actual
bargaining, the Trial Examiner recommended to the Board that Ex-
Cell-O be ordered to pay to the employees an amount equal to the wage
increase which would have been granted to the employees if Ex-Cell-O
had negotiated an agreement with the union instead of seeking court
review. The amount of the increase in wages that would have been
granted if there had been bargaining would be only a speculation, but
since the retroactivity period by the time Ex-Cell-O was decided was a
few days under five years, the penalty for refusing to bargain to obtain
court review would have been astronomical. Members McCulloch and
Brown voted to support, and Members Fanning and Jenkins voted not
to support the unusual remedy recommended by the Trial Examiner,
and a deadlock resulted. It was not until Chairman Miller joined the
Board that the tie was broken. He sided with Fanning and Jenkins and
the recommended penalty was rejected. 13
12. 185 N.L.R.B. No. 20 (1970).
13, Three similar retroactive penalty 8(a)(5) cases were deadlocked and decided on a basis
similar to Ex-Cell-O-0-Zinker Foods. Herman Wilson Lumber Co. and Rasco
Vol. 1970: 389]
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The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia would have
supported the two dissenters. During the argument of the Tiidee
Products case 4 it was asserted that the employer refused to bargain by
raising "frivolous" issues at the bargaining table. The court remanded
the case to the Board with the suggestion that the employer be punished
for his refusal to bargain by the assessment of a retroactive wage
increase. However, the Ex-Cell-O decision is so written that the remedy
suggested by the court will not be issued by the Board. The majority
opinion said it would be improper to assess a retroactive wage increase
penalty even though therefusal to bargain was "frivolous" rather than
"debatable," because what is "debatable" to the Board may appear
"frivolous" to a court, and vice versa.
In addition to the reasons given in the Board's majority opinion in
Ex-Cell-O, the real service to the public rendered by the majority when
it closed the door to the assessment of a financial penalty against an
employer in an 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain situation is the fact that to
have done otherwise would have converted managements into weaker
bargainers. Managements would have had to add to the loss from a
strike the risk of the financial loss that the Board could assess if it, at
a union's request, evaluated the proposals made by the management
and found the company a law violator because its proposals were too
hard, as the Board did in Stuart Radiator Core.'5 There, the employer
proposed three well drafted clauses to the union. One clearly reserved
to management the right to manage; another clearly stated that the
union waived bargaining during the agreement (similar to the well-
Olympia-emphasizing the broad impact on the power balance had Ex-Cell-O been decided the
other way.
14. International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (Tiidee Products) v.
NLRB, 426 F.2d 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The final curtain has not been run down on Ex-Cell-O,
because an appeal has been filed by the General Counsel to the Circuit Court of the District of
Columbia which has expressed its viewpoint in the Tiidee remand. Tiidee Products has filed a
petition for certiorari. BNA DAILY LAB. RPT. No. 178, Sept. 14, 1970, A-I.
15. 173 N.L.R.B. No. 27 (1968). Senator Walsh, Chairman of the Senate Committee,
explained the obligation to bargain being incorporated into the law:
...The bill indicates the method and manner in which employees may organize, .
manner of selecting their ...spokesmen, and leads them to the office door of their
employer with the legal authority to negotiate for their fellow employees. The bill does not
go beyond the office door. It leaves the discussion between the employer and the employee,
and the agreements which they may or may not make, voluntary. ...
Smith, The Evolution of the Duty to Bargain Concept in American Law, 39 MIcH. L. REV. 1065,
1087, 1085 (1941). The Board in Stuart Radiator Core, 173 N.L.R.B. No. 27 (1968), did what
Congress said would not be done. It looked over the shoulder of the employer and evaluated the
proposals he made and then, saying that the proposal would be unacceptable to the union, held
the employer guilty of violating the law.
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known agreement between General Motors and the UAW);16 and the
third clearly stated that the agreement was the only agreement between
the parties.
The Board found the company guilty of a refusal to bargain because
the proposal of these three clauses was "more than hard bargaining,"
stating that "the [company] certainly could not have offered [these
clauses] with any reasonable expectation that they would be acceptable
to the union, we can only conclude that the [company] did not
approach negotiations in good faith." Therefore, the Board is saying,
or at least said, that acceptability of a proposal by the union is a
proper standard to determine an employer's good faith as a bargainer.
What a surprise this would be to the senators who urged their fellow
senators to vote for the Act in its original form with these words:17
The Committee wishes to dispel any possible false impression that this
bill is designed to compel the making of agreements or to permit
governmental supervision of their terms. . .. [Tihe essence of free
collective bargaining is that either party shall be free to decide whether
proposals made to it are satisfactory. (Emphasis added)
Free collective bargaining is based on the premise that the power on
the union side is the economic hurt a strike can cause the employer
by no sales income and loss of customers, and the power on the
employer's side is the economic hurt a strike can cause employees by
loss of wage income (reduced substantially when strikes occur when
temporary work is readily available). The risk of additional financial
penalty assessed by a government board against the employer would,
of course, be an arbitrary increase in the unions' bargaining power and
would be a Board decision inconsistent with the first of the two
essential elements in the national labor policy.
Some might say the damage to free collective bargaining that would
have been caused if Ex-Cell-O had been decided the other way is
overstated when illustrated by the penalties that could be assessed
against an employer-bargainer proposing clauses similar to those in
Stuart Radiator Core. It might even be pointed out that the Board
16. C.B.N.C. 21-1 (BNA 1970).
17 S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1935).The 80-day injunction is a governmental
action which arbitrarily blocks the free collective bargaining process for 80 days. This interference
with the process is not a rejection of it and is justified on the ground that, in the particular contest,
too many others are hurt by the process and more bargaining time should be provided. This
procedure is in no way inconsistent with the thesis that the public is vitally interested in
settlements produced by free collective bargaining as opposed to a bargaining process where one
party is aided by a government board to obtain excessive concessions from the other.
Vol. 1970: 389]
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members may now realize that that decision went too far. In
Cartriseal, l1 and in its second Long Lake Lumber 9 decision, the Board
found that the company did not violate the law when it proposed three
clauses similar to those found "too hard" in Stuart Radiator Core.
However, even though the Board may have backed away from Stuart
Radiator Core in these latter decisions, the Board is still saying that it
has the right to evaluate the "hardness" of proposals made by the
employer, and if it determines that the proposals are too "hard" the
company can be found guilty of a refusal to bargain.?0
Furthermore, the denial of a retroactive penalty in Ex-Cell-O should
not cause managements to become too relaxed. The majority said that
even though retroactive pay would be an improper remedy for an
8(a)(5) violation, an injunction under 106j) or 10(e) might well be a
proper remedy to cause an employer to cease a refusal to bargain .2
What does this mean? Could the Board order an employer to withdraw
a proposal or modify one if it thought the proposal was too hard and
could not have been offered "with any reasonable expectation that [it]
would be acceptable to the union,' 22 and then issue an injunction
directing the employer to adjust his bargaining stance?
Even prior to the Board's decision in Ex-Cell-O, the General Counsel
had obtained a 10() injunction from a District Judge in northern
Indiana ordering the Portage Realty Corporation2 to refrain,
...from failing or refusing upon request to submit counterproposals
for a collective bargaining agreement;
from demanding or insisting upon unreasonable or oppressive concessions
from the unions.
If decisions like this become common, employers will become weaker
18. 178 N.L.R.B. No. 47 (1969).
19. 182 N.L.R.B. No. 65 (1970).
20. If the Board members continue to espouse this view, they will be confessing that they were
not listening to the Supreme Court. In H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970), the
Court said the Board has no right to order an employer to agree to a checkoff clause. This means
the Board should not concern itself with the merits or demerits of the proposals of the employer
or the union. The Supreme Court's opinion was the basis of the Board's opinion in Ex-Cell-O.
This recognition of the teaching of Porter may cause the Board to abandon its evaluation of the
"hardness" of proposals made by the employer.
21. A 10(e) injunction against Ex-Cell-O has been petitioned for by the Board. BNA DAILY
LAB. RPi. No. 201, Oct. 15, 1970, AA-I.
22. Stuart Radiator Core, 173 N.L.R.B. No. 27 (1968).
23. Little v. Portage Realty Corp., - F. Supp. _ 73 L.R.R.M. 2971 (N.D. Ind. 1970).
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bargainers because the threat of punishment for contempt will be added
to the risk of loss from a strike, increasing the unions' bargaining
power. How is the employer to judge what the Board or court might
find "unreasonable" or "oppressive"? The use of a 10(j) or 10(e)
injunction, just as an order of retroactive pay to enforce employer
compliance to what the Board believes the employer should propose or
not propose at the bargaining table, is a governmental interference with
the free collective bargaining process. Bargaining then ceases to be free
and is not the institution now being relied upon as the regulator? When
the government arbitrarily changes the relative bargaining strength of
either of the two contestants, the first of the two elements of national
labor policy, identified earlier herein, has been violated.
Consistent with the principle that free collective bargaining should.
be encouraged and arbitrary shifts of bargaining power by Board
decisions should be avoided, the Board, after a strong nudge from the
Supreme Court, has cleared off more of the legal cobwebs that had
accumulated on the employer's right to lockout, making it more clear
that the lockout was a counter to the union's strike power. The Board
has held that, where a strike is called by the union against another
employer in a group of employers who traditionally are forced to
follow the pattern established by the first settlement in the group
(situations like the negotiations between the UAW and the Big Three
auto companies), any one of the employers can lock out. In Evening
News Association,2 4 the employees of one newspaper who were
members of a union striking another newspaper were locked out
because their employer knew the settlement at the other paper would
be his pattern.21
Fortunately, as unions grew in power and settlement levels rose, U.S.
24. 166 N.L.R.B. 219 (1967). The Board's original decision in Evening News found the lockout
to be a violation of Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the Act. 145 N.L.R.B. 996 (1964). The sixth
circuit reversed the Board's decision, 346 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1965), and on appeal the Supreme
Court vacated, 382 U.S. 374 (1%6), and instructed the sixth circuit to remand the case back to
the Board for reconsideration in the light of the Supreme Court's opinion in American Ship
Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965). It was pursuant to this ordered reconsideration that
the Board held the lockout to be lawful. Since the Board's second decision and the sixth circuit's
second review, 404 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1968), are reconsiderations directed by the Supreme Court
and certiorari was denied, 395 U.S. 923 (1969), the case is most significant.
25 In Davis Friedland, 158 N.L.R.B. 571 (1966), a lockout by contractor-employers in an
employers' association in support of employers in the neighboring association was held to violate
the law even though employees from the neighboring association were working for member
contractors in the other association. This case appears inconsistent with Evening News and
certainly is detrimental to the efforts of contractor-employers to improve their bargaining strength
vis-a-vis the building trades unions which has caused the problems reported in note 4 supra.
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managements have been able to raise the productivity of manufacturing
plants. Otherwise, prices would not be as low as they are today. For
example, the cost of an automatic washing machine has risen only 9.6%
in the last 15 years, whereas the wages paid to the employees who make
the machines rose nearly 100% in the same period.26 The wage increases
that were not passed on in price increases were absorbed in reduced
production costs that managements have been able to obtain through
improved machinery and more efficient procedures.
In some countries, managements have not been able to introduce
improvements fast enough to avoid gigantic unit labor cost increases.
This has been especially true in England. There, managements in many
industries have been retarded by labor relations procedures which
emphasize advance joint consultation on all managerial changes that
affect employees. If a dispute arises, the status quo must be maintained
until agreement with the union is reached or the dispute is processed
to impasse months later before a management court in York,
England. These procedures create a swampy path through which an
English management, attempting to improve efficiency, must slowly
struggle to improve the productivity of a plant.
A very articulate Englishman, an executive of a plant in Coventry,
England, put his finger squarely on the problem. He explained to the
Royal Commission, sitting in London, why English managements have
not been able to introduce improvements as fast as their counterparts
in North America, causing English plants to slip behind in
productivity. What he said is very important:2s
The major difference between the industrial relations system in North
America and the system in the U.K. is that the method of collective
bargaining in North America assigns to management a precise and
specific management function which it may exercise during the term of
the contract, subject only to the right of a union representative to object
by filing grievances and processing them through a procedure
culminating in arbitration if he believes management has acted in a
manner inconsistent with the agreement.
The effect is that . . . management is able to produce change at a
much faster rate than we are able to do in this country. Any change
26. Maytag Bulletin, September 10, 1970. While wages increased nearly 100% in the past 15
years, the cost of Maytag dryers declined 6.5%.
27. H. SEYFARTH, L. SHAW, 0. FAIRWEATHER & R. GERALDSON, LABOR RELATIONS AND THE
LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES 83 (1968).
28. Testimony of H.J. Hebden, in ROYAL COMM'N ON TRADE UNIONS AND EMPLOYRS'
ASSOCIATIONS, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE 25, 1004 (1966).
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consistent with the terms of the contract may be introduced by
management immediately . . . . There is a specific acknowledgment in
every agreement with the trade unions that management has the right
to make changes.
In the U.K. because there is no enforceable recognition of
management's specific functions, management must be prepared to
negotiate every time it wishes to make a change. The result is that we
tend to have to bargain under pressure all the time .... Because of
this there is a tendency that the compromise when finally worked out
will be a less efficient change than the North American equivalent action
taken by management ...
In labor relations language, this Englishman was explaining that the
success of U.S. plants is based on what is referred to as the "reserved
rights principle". This simply means that managements, hired to
manage, must have the right under the labor agreement to promptly
initiate change, subject to one limitation: that the change that is
initiated does not violate some specific provision of the agreement. This
simple "reserved rights principle" has permitted the many needed
productivity improvements to be introduced quickly into U.S. plants,
and has avoided the debating society condition in U.S. plants which
continuous bargaining over every managerial change has generated in
English plants.2
The simple and understandable "reserved rights principle" which has
permitted U.S. plants to increase productivity rapidly is deeply
impressed upon the labor relations of this country. For over 35 years
arbitrators have respected it. 30 One arbitrator, after analyzing the
29. The problem caused by continuous day-to-day debate in a production plant over efficiency
improvements that management desires to introduce was well expressed by William Leiserson, a
former member of the National Labor Relations Board, when he said:
. . We do not have to be versed in the philosophy of management to understand that it
is not practical to mix the policy-making functions of an organization with the operating
functions.
It does not work and it satisfies no one. It leads to maneuvering and argument about
policy among operating officials whose sole duty should be to carry out promptly and
efficiently the operating orders ... . It turns a production organization into a debating
society.
As quoted in Fairweather & Shaw, Minimizing Disputes in Labor Contract Negotiations, 12 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 308 (1947).
30 Omaha Cold Storage Terminal, 48 Lab. Arb. 24 (1967) (Doyle, Arbitrator); Olin
Matheson Chemical Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. 1020 (1964) (Klamon, Arbitrator); American Sugar, 38
Lab Arb. 714 (1% 1) (Quinlan, Arbitrator); Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp., 9 Basic Steel Arb. 6697,
6699 (1% 1) (Valtin, Arbitrator); Texas-Portland Cement Co., 61-2 ARB 8343 (1961) (Autrey,
Arbitrator); Great Lakes Steel Corp., 8 Basic Steel Arb. 5603 (1959) (Alexander, Arbitrator);
Reynolds Metals Co., 25 Lab. Arb. 44 (1958) (Prasow, Arbitrator); Aurora Gasoline Co., 29 Lab.
Vol. 1970: 389]
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decisions of many other arbitrators, said that ". . . there are countless
hundreds of arbitrators, who follow and accept the reserved rights
theory of management rights .... ,,31
Arbitrator Singletary explained:
The overwhelming line of authority, however, seems to be that it is a
fundamental principle and a construction of collective bargaining
agreements that Management continues to retain all the rights that it
had prior to entrance into an effective collective bargaining contract,
which it did not give up in that contract.
This same principle has been stated in different ways, such as:
'These are the residual rights of the Company, rights which remain
with the Company because it has no agreement with the Union to forego
them.'
'These rights may be contracted away or modified by agreement, but
are not removed by inference.'
It has been generally accepted throughout the United States that
managements' rights not specifically surrendered in a collective
bargaining agreement are reserved to management. 32
In this connection it should be noted that the Supreme Court has
pointed out that arbitrators are the group that has the expertise when
the construction of a labor agreement is in issue. 33
Arthur Goldberg, when he was General Counsel for the United
Steelworkers, respected it. He said, if plants are to be efficiently
Arb. 495 (1957) (Howlett, Arbitrator); Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 27 Lab. Arb. 520 (1956)
(Williams, Arbitrator); Monsanto Chemical Co., 27 Lab. Arb. 736, 743 (1956) (Roberts,
Arbitrator); Babcock & Wilcox, 26 Lab. Arb. 172 (1956) (Kates, Arbitrator); United Wallpaper,
25 Lab. Arb. 188 (1955) (Sembower, Arbitrator); Celotex Corp., 24 Lab. Arb. 369 (1955)
(Reynard, Arbitrator); Stewart-Wagner Corp., 22 Lab. Arb. 369 (1954) (Burns, Arbitrator);
Great Lakes Carbon, 19 Lab. Arb. 797 (1952) (Wettach, Arbitrator); U.S. Potters Assn., 19 Lab.
Arb. 213 (1952) (Uible, Arbitrator); McKinney Mfg. Co., 19 Lab. Arb. 291 (1952) (Reid,
Arbitrator); Illinois Bell Telephone, 15 Lab. Arb. 213 (1950) (David, Arbitrator); Sommers &
Co., 6 Lab. Arb. 283 (1947) (Whiting, Arbitrator); Blackhawk Mfg., 7 Lab. Arb. 943 (1947)
(Updegraff, Arbitrator); Novelty Shawl, 4 Lab. Arb. 655 (1946) (Wallen, Arbitrator); Goodyear
Tire Co., I Lab. Arb. 557 (1946) (McCoy, Arbitrator).
31. Mead Corporation, 46 Lab. Arb. 459 (1966) (Kilamon, Arbitrator).
32. American Sugar Refining Company, Chalmette Refinery, 61-1 ARB % 8137 at 3664
(1961).
33. In United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf N. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960), the
Court said that, when it comes to interpretation of labor agreements, the arbitrator has the
expertise because he "is usually chosen because of the parties' confidence in his knowledge of the
common law of the shop . . . the parties expect that his judgment of a particular grievance will
reflect not only what the contract says but, insofar as the collective agreement permits such
factors as the effect upon productivity of a particular result. . . . The ablest judge cannot be
expected to bring the same experience and competence to bear upon the determination of a
grievance because he cannot be similarly informed."
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operated, the management must have the right to direct efficiency
improvements and the union should challenge the directed change only
if it is believed that the change is inconsistent with some specific
provision of the agreement.Y
That the intention of the parties when they agreed to the typical
management rights clause was to reserve to management the right to
initiate changes not inconsistent with some specific clause of the
agreement would seem to flow from the essentially uniform
determination by arbitrators for 35 years that this was their intention.
Furthermore, since construing management clauses to "reserve the
right" to initiate changes rapidly is a reason why U.S. managements
have initiated productivity improvements with great speed, enabling
wage cost increases to be absorbed and real income to rise, its erosion
should be prevented. For this very simple reason, the President's
National Commission on Productivity5 should make the protection of
the "reserved rights" construction that arbitrators give to management
clauses one of its primary goals.
During the last eight years the Board members, who the Supreme
Court noted do not have any special expertise in labor contract
interpretation, 3  have felt compelled to construe the typical
management clause differently than it has been construed by the parties
and arbitrators for 35 years. They have said it was not intended by the
union to be its agreement to the general understanding that
management reserved the right to manage-that is, the right to
unilaterally initiate changes in plant operations that are not
inconsistent with a specific provision of the agreement.
The acorn from which the large oak grew which is threatening to
smother the long-established "reserved rights" construction of
management clauses was planted in the Fibreboard decision in 1962.31
34. Goldberg, Management's Reserved Rights: A Labor View, in MANAGEMENT RIGHTS AND
THE ARBITRATION PROCESS 118, 123 (1956).
35, Seenote9supra.
36. In Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 181 (1967), the Court pointed out that Board members
do not have any more expertise in labor agreement interpretation than courts when reviewing "the
substantive positions taken and policies pursued by a union in its negotiation of a collective
bargaining agreement and in its handling of the grievance machinery; as these matters are not
normally within the Board's unfair labor practice jurisdiction, it can be doubted whether the
Board brings substantially greater expertise to bear on these problems than do the courts ......
Board Chairman Edward B. Miller, sworn in on June 3, is the only member of the Board who
has been personally involved in the collective bargaining process. For backgrounds of the other
members see Stewart & Engeman, Impasse, Collective Bargaining and Action, 39 U. CiN. R. REV.
233, 240 n. 32 (1970).
37. Fibreboard Paper Products, Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 1558 (1961), reopened and redecided, 138
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There, the Board said that a management was obligated by law to
consult with the union in advance before initiating a plan to reduce
costs by having some work currently being performed by employees
performed by an outside contractor and to bargain over this cost-
reduction plan to an agreement with the union or to an impasse.
Obviously, the plan to subcontract resulted from a "make or buy" cost
analysis of a type made hundreds of times each day by U.S.
managements. Such analysis is merely the regulator we call
competition operating to generate the pressures we rely upon as a
matter of national policy to improve plant productivity or to cause
work to flow to where it can be performed at a lower cost-with either
alternative holding down price rises to the benefit of the consumer.3"
In spite of some of the attempts of some courts to limit the scope
of the Fibreboard decision, 39 the Board in Ozark Trailers" in 1966
N.L.R.B. 550, affd, 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1962), affd, 378 U.S. 203 (1964). The continuing
legal obligation to bargain during the term of the agreement was first enunciated by the Board
in Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1996 (1949), but the implementation in the
managerial decision-making area did not start until 1962.
38. The Supreme Court recognizes the role of competition as a regulator and interprets the
Sherman Act as a legislative effort to proscribe all restraints on the "free and natural flow of
trade in the channels of interstate commerce" and the flow of work to a subcontractor should
be part of the free and natural flow of trade. Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Assn. v.
United States, 234 U.S. 600, 609 (1914). See Times Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345
U.S. 594,605 (1953); Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (195 1).
39. In NLRB v. Adams Dairy, 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011
(1966), a finding that a unilateral change in method of distribution of products without prior
bargaining was reversed because "To require Adams to bargain about its decision to close out
the distribution end of its business would significantly abridge its freedom to manage its own
affairs. Bargaining is not contemplated in this area under the history and usage of § 8(a)(5)."
350 F.2d at I 1. (Emphasis added) Similar reversals of the Board's view that an employer must
bargain before it can close part or all of its operations are: Morrison Cafeterias, Inc. v. NLRB,
- F.2d - 74 L.R.R.M. 3048 (8th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Drapery Mfg. Co., 425 F.2d 1026
(8th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Thompson Transport Co., 406 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1969); NLRB v.
Transmarine Navigation Corp., 380 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. William J. Burns Int'l
Detective Agency, 346 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350
F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1964). The Board's finding that the employer must bargain (1) before instituting
new operating procedures at a freight terminal even though it resulted in the layoff of some 15
employees was reversed in NLRB v. Dixie Ohio Express Co., 409 F.2d 10 (6th Cir. 1969); (2)
before changing food prices in the cafeteria operated by an 'outside party, Westinghouse Electric
v. NLRB, 387 F.2d 542 (4th Cir. 1967); (3) before changing prices in a cafeteria operated by the
employer, McCall Corp. v. NLRB, - F.2d - 75 L.R.R.M. (4th Cir. 1970); (4) before
subcontracting where the detriment to employees in the bargaining unit was not established,
Puerto Rico Telephone Co. v. NLRB, 359 F.2d 982 (1st Cir. 1966); District 50, United Mine
Workers v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1966).
40. Recently the Board found violations where the employer was clearly improving efficiency
or profitability but failed to engage in advance bargaining over the change up to the point of
impasse when installing remote control equipment which dispensed with the cost of five employees,
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made it perfectly clear that the new interpretation it was grafting onto
the law was intended by the Board to mean that a management must
either (1) discuss in advance with the union every intended change in
manufacturing procedures which would affect the employees and
bargain concerning the change until agreement is reached or impasse
occurs, or (2) obtain from the union, and usually at a price 41 a specific
waiver of the union's right to bargain in advance over the change in
manufacturing procedures. The Board said:
We recognize, of course, that the Supreme Court's decision in
Fibreboard was limited to the type of contracting out involved in that
case, and did not explicitly deal with the question whether an employer
must bargain concerning a decision to terminate a portion of its
operations. We further recognize that two Courts of Appeal have held,
in reliance on the concurring opinion in Fibreboard, that a decision of
this nature need not be bargained about. Thus, in N.L.R.B. v. Adams
Dairy Inc., 350 F.2d 108, 60 L.R.R.M. 2084, cert. denied, 382 U.S.
10 11, 61 L.R.R.M. 2192, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
held that a managerial decision to substitute independent contractors for
employees in the distribution of the employer's products was outside the
mandatory bargaining requirements of the Act on the ground that it
involved a 'basic operational change' and a 'partial liquidation and a
recoup of capital investment.' Similarly, in N.L.R.B. v. Royal Plating
Richland, Inc., 180 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 73 L.R.R.M. 1017 (1969); when changing to bulk shipment
from shipment in bags to save labor cost, Arkansas Rice Growers Association, 171 N.L-R.B.
No 14, 68 L.R.R.M. 1453 (1968); when increasing "delivery and handling" charge to customers
which narrowed the margin within which the employee-salesman on commission could negotiate
car sales; when establishing more stringent safety rules to lower accident costs, NLRB v. Gulf
Power Co., 384 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1967); when changing the end-of-shift clean-up procedure,
Wald Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, - F.2d - 74 L.R.R.M. 2375 (6th Cir. 1970); when changing
employment application form to include agreement to use of polygraph employer, NLRB v.
Laney & Duke Co., 369 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1966); when instituting crew size changes and other
operating improvements at a freight terminal, Dixie Ohio Express Co., 167 NLRB 573 (1967),
rev'd sub nom. NLRB v. Dixie Ohio Express Co., 409 F.2d 10 (6th Cir. 1969).
41 Before Fibreboard, the traditional reserved rights view was that management possesses all
rights needed to perform its function and initiate change unilaterally and rapidly unless the union
has persuaded the management to specifically limit its managerial rights. After Fibreboard, the
Board is saying that if management wants to perform its function unilaterally and rapidly it must
obtain from the union a waiver of its statutory right to block change until the union agrees to
the desired change or a bargaining impasse has been reached. This shift has placed the union in
a position to exact a price for granting waivers and hence represents a development inconsistent
with the first of the two elements of national labor policy discussed at the outset of this paper.
However, since the Board's views, unless modified, will have a more adverse effect on
management's ability to rapidly increase plant productivity so as to offset the cost-push effect of
annual wage cost increases, the Board's view is evaluated herein under the second of the two
essential elements of national labor policy.
Vol. 1970: 389]
Washington University Open Scholarship
404 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1970: 389
& Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191, 60 L.R.R.M. 2033, the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit held that a decision to shut one of an employer's
two plants involved a 'management decision to recommit and reinvest
funds in the business' and a 'major change in the economic direction of
the Company,' and, accordingly, that the employer was under no duty
to bargain with the union respecting that decision.
With all respect to the Courts of Appeals for the Third and Eighth
Circuits, we do not believe that the question whether a particular
management decision must be bargained about should turn on whether
the decision involves the commitment of investment capital, or on
whether it may be characterized as involving 'major' or 'basic' change
in the nature of the employer's business.
After this decision, it was clear that the Board intended to impose
upon U.S. industrial managers the obligation to engage in advance
joint consultation over any change the management desired to initiate
and to refrain from making the change until the union agreed to it or
until an impasse occurred. This joint consultation with the obligation
to maintain status quo until agreement or impasse is the English
procedure described by the Englishman as the root cause for the low
rate of productivity improvement in plants in that country. The
Englishman also said that, to avoid delays, compromises would be
worked out which caused the change ultimately made to be less efficient
than it would otherwise have been. The following statement in Ozark
indicates that the Board recognized that its new views would likewise
produce compromises which would mean that the change actually
made would not be the most efficient change. It said:
[D]espite management's interest in absolute freedom to run the business
as it sees fit, the interests of employees are of sufficient importance that
their representatives ought to be consulted in matter[s] affecting them,
and that the public interest, which includes the interests of both
employers and employees, is best served by subjecting problems between
labor and management to the mediating influence of collective
bargaining. (Emphasis added)
When it comes to bargaining over a managerial change which affects
employees, the mediating influence of collective bargaining can only
mean that the change ultimately introduced will affect fewer people and
reduce cost less than would have otherwise occurred.42
42. Some observers argue that the legal obligation to bargain changes to improve efficiency to
an agreement or an impasse can be justified on the ground that the bargaining produces the
communication which will forewarn those affected by the change and reduce the suddenness that
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The slow strangulation of the "reserved rights" construction of
management clauses started with the Fibreboard decision, but it was
the very narrow meaning given to the typical management rights clause
by the Board that has done the actual damage. The typical clause was
construed not to constitute a waiver by the union of its right to bargain
over managerial changes which the management planned to introduce
to reduce costs, because a waiver of a statutory right could only be
established by a general reservation of the right of management to
make changes. Only if the intended change was fully discussed with
"alternatives conscientiously explored" and the waiver of the right to
advance bargaining recorded in specific language, could the change be
initiated without advance consultation. 43 For example, a typical
management rights clause in the Weltronic labor agreement says:"
The union agrees that the management of the company has the right to
manage the affairs of the business, to control its properties, and
equipment and to direct the working forces .. in accordance with and
might generate a labor dispute which might obstruct commerce. Sigal, The Evolving Duty to
Bargain. 52 GEo. L.J. 384-85 (1964). Any competent management knows that when employees
are being asked to change working procedures or use new machines which will displace employees,
advance explanation is wise and such explanations are made. The slowing down of the rate of
productivity improvement by requiring the illusory point of impasse to pass before making the
change cannot be justified on the ground that employees might otherwise violate the no-strike
commitment assumed in the labor agreement. The law should support the benefits society gains
from a rapid rate of productivity improvement and should not be designed to appease potential
wildcat strikers.
43 Even where, in addition to a management clause reserving the right of management to
initiate managerial change, there was a clause in the agreement stating that the union waives its
statutory right to engage in bargaining during the life of the agreement, no waiver is found. Most
waiver clauses are similar to the one in the General Motors agreement which says:
The parties acknowledge that during the negotiations which resulted in this Agreement,
each had the unlimited right and opportunity to make demands and proposals with respect
to any subject or matter not removed by law from the area of collective bargaining, and
that the understandings and agreements arrived at by the parties after the exercise of that
right and opportunity are set forth in this Agreement. Therefore, the Corporation and the
Union, for the life of this agreement, each voluntarily and unqualifiedly waives the right,
and each agrees that the other shall not be obligated, to bargain collectively with respect
to any subject or matter referred to, or covered in this agreement, or with respect to any
subject or matter not specifically referred to or covered in this Agreement, even though
such subject or matter may not have been within the knowledge or contemplation of either
or both of the parties at the time that they negotiated or signed this Agreement.
This clause was held to be ineffective as a waiver of bargaining in International Union, United
Automobile Workers v. NLRB, 381 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir.), ceri. denied, 389 U.S. 857 (1967).
Q United Drop Forge Div., 171 N.L.R.B. No. 73, 68 L.R.R.M. 1129 (1968); Litton Precision
Products, 156 N.L.R.B. 555 (1966).
44. 173 N.L.R.B. No. 40 (1968), enforced, Weltronic Co. v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir.
1969)
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subject to the terms of this agreement. Said functions of management
include the right to hire, discharge or discipline for just cause, to
establish new jobs and discontinue jobs, maintain discipline and
efficiency of employees, to determine the type of products to be
manufactured, the location of plants, plan scheduling of production,
methods, processes and means of manufacture.
But in spite of these clear words, the Board found the union that signed
the agreement containing them could not have intended to waive its
statutory right to bargain over managerial change. Hence the
management was obligated by the statute, the Board said, to consult
with the union in advance over a change the management wanted to
initiate to improve plant efficiency and to bargain over the proposed
change until agreement is reached or impasse occurs.
The Board knew that a construction of labor agreement language
which rejected the finding of a waiver from a clause reserving the right
to management to initiate change subject to any specific limitations in
the agreement, plus a clause in which the union agreed to waive its
statutory right to bargain over managerial change, was a construction
of labor agreement language contrary to the understanding of the
parties because it knew this construction was contrary to the
construction given this language by arbitrators. It also knew its
construction of labor agreement language would clash with the more
traditional construction and be the death knell to the "reserved right"
to make changes. The Board's effort to undermine the traditional
construction was made perfectly clear in a brief submitted to the U.S.
Supreme Court where the Board said:45
Many arbitrators . . . apply the so-called 'residual rights' theory when
management takes unilateral action, holding that it is free to act unless
the collective agreement expressly provides otherwise . . . . Such a
doctrine, which bestows upon management all 'residual rights', stands
on its head the established rule that a statutory waiver must be express
and clear; .... (Emphasis added)
If, as the Englishman said, the "reserved rights" construction of the
typical management clause is the secret of why productivity rises more
rapidly in the U.S., this construction should be encouraged-not
destroyed. Such clauses should be construed to be waivers by the union
45. Petitioner's brief at 28 n. 20, NLRB v. C & C Plywood, 385 U.S. 421 (1967).
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of rights to bargain over managerial change during the term of the
agreement.
If the Board in its decisional process has passed the point of no
return so that management rights clauses cannot be written to
accomplish their clear purpose, then the needed protection of the right
to introduce change rapidly would require legislation. Fortunately, an
analysis will show that legislation is not needed if the Board follows
some of the guides it has announced in certain recent decisions.
About a year ago in Marion Simcox,"1 the Board was considering
whether a management rights clause that said that "[T]he management
of the yard, including . . . the extent to which locations . . . shall
operate or be shut down shall be solely and exclusively the prerogative
of the Company" constituted a waiver of the union's right to advance
consultation over the closing of part of the business. The Board said
this not untypical reserved rights clause was sufficient to waive the
union's right to bargain and hence permitted a trustee in bankruptcy
to make prompt unilateral changes without advance consultation so as
to conserve assets.
The small candle that was lighted in Marion Simcox became a
lantern in Consolidated Foods . 4 There the Board reversed the Trial
Examiner and held that another rather typical management clause
should be considered a waiver of the union's right to bargain in
advance over a managerial change. In a footnote, the Board
distinguished the management clause in Consolidated Foods from the
management clause in Weltronic by saying that in the former the
authority to manage is reserved solely and exclusively to the
management, and hence could properly be construed to mean that the
union had relinquished its statutory right to bargain over future
managerial changes."8 These two decisions could well mean that if
46. 178 N.L.R.B. No. 85 (1969).
47. 183 N.L.R.B. No. 78 (1970).
48 The footnote stated:
In our opinion, Weltronic Company, 173 N.L.R.B. No. 40, enfd. 419 F.2d 1120 (C.A.
6), is distinguishable. There, the Board, in finding that the union had not negotiated away
its rights to bargain about interunit job transfers, was confronted with a clause which,
while reflecting the union's agreement that the employer was responsible for general
management of the business, included no language expressing union assent to
management's right to unilaterally make business decisions having an adverse impact on
unit employees. Thus, unlike the instant case, the clause in issue there was devoid of
language investing management with 'exclusive' or 'sole' discretion as to changes in
mandatory subjects of collective bargaining. Nor did the Weltronic contract provisions
have the scope of the instant one, which gives Respondent exclusive right at all times to
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properly drafted management rights clauses reserving to management
the sole and exclusive right to unilaterally initiate change are
introduced into all labor agreements, the rate of productivity
improvement in U.S. plants can be maintained at the fast rate that is
needed to help offset the cost increases of the yearly wage and benefit
improvements.
In addition to the change in the Board's views concerning what type
of contract language constitutes a waiver of a union's right to bargain
over managerial change, the Board's view concerning the obligation of
an employer to bargain over a desired managerial change until
agreement with the union is reached or impasse occurs may also be
undergoing change.
The point in time when an impasse actually occurs has been difficult
to determine." Since the Board says the determination of the point of
impasse is a judgment decision requiring the weighing of various
factors-and actually is ultimately determined by the visceral reaction
of the Trial Examiner and the Board-the employer cannot safely
determine when an impasse first occurs:
Whether a bargaining impasse exists is a matter of judgment. The
bargaining history, the good faith of the parties in negotiations, the
length of negotiations, the importance of the issue or issues as to which
there is disagreement, the contemporaneous understanding of the parties
as to the state of negotiations are all relevant factors to be considered
in deciding whether an impasse in bargaining existed.5
Unless the rate of productivity improvement is going to be overly
slowed down, it is critical to the employer to determine the point when
impasse first occurs, if an impasse must occur before a managerial
change can take place. If he guesses wrong and initiates the
productivity change too soon, he violates the law. The union's interest
in the point of impasse is somewhat different. It wants to delay its
occurrence so that the effectuation of the change will be delayed to
push forward the time when employees will be affected.
'change, modify or cease its operation, processes or production.' Additionally, that
contract involved another clause protecting employees against the effects of job elimination
and transfers, and such a restriction, not present here, was viewed as significant to the
finding that the union in Weltronic had not waived its right to be consulted about the
transfer of work from one plant to another.
49. It is at the point where the parties are simply deadlocked. NLRB v. Tex-Lan Inc., 318
F.2d 472, 482 (5th Cir. 1963).
50. Taft Broadcasting Co., WDAF AM-FM TV, 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967), affd, 395
F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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The requirement that managerial change affecting employees cannot
occur until there is an impasse may have been given a shattering blow
by the Supreme Court in American Ship Building Company v. NLRB51
and by circuit 6ourts in Lane v. NLRB52 and Detroit Newspaper
Publishers Association v. NLRB.53 These cases clearly establish the
proposition that an employer can lock out employees before an impasse
occurs. Since the most drastic change affecting employees that could
be initiated by an employer is to put them out on the street without
pay checks, and since this change can be initiated by the employer
before an impasse, it should shatter the Board's theory that a
managerial change that affects employees cannot be initiated until
impasse.
If the Board desires to implement the national policy and encourage
a high rate of productivity improvement, it need only take the lead
from these court decisions and state that where it finds no waiver which
permits management to initiate change, the management is only
obligated to give the union notice of the contemplated change since the
Act simply does not compel a delay in valid management improvement
changes until impasse any more than the Act requires an impasse
before a management can lock out.
But even more significant than these court cases on the 'delays that
can grow out of an obligation to bargain over managerial change is
the Board's own decision in the second Long Lake Lumber case this
year" where the Board reversed the Trial Examiner and explained how
the opportunity to bargain over a change can follow the initiation of
the change and occur in the early steps of the contract grievance
procedure:
The 'management' authority which Respondent sought to reserve unto
itself related only to matters on which the contract was left silent.
• . . Respondent's management rights proposals would not have
precluded future bargaining. The management authority Respondent
51. 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
52• 418 F.2d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
53, 346 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1965).
54. 182 N.L.R.B. No. 65 (1970). The fact that a strike was permitted at the conclusion of the
grievance procedure under the Long Lake Lumber agreement was noted by the Board as
distinguishing Stuart Radiator Core, 173 N.L.R.B. No. 27 (1968). Since arbitration is favored
over strike action and is the quid pro quo for the no-strike clause, Lucas Flour Co. v. Teamsters
Local 174, 369 U.S. 95 (1962), the Board certainly is not suggesting that the clause was proper
only because there was a right to strike at the end of the grievance procedure. The management
clause should also be proper if arbitration were substituted for a strike.
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demanded was only to take initial action without consulting the Union
in advance. Once such action was taken, the Union would have the right,
and Respondent the correlative obligation, to subject the action taken to
post hoc review under the grievance procedure where the Union would
be afforded the opportunity through give and take discussion to obtain
a change in management's action. . . . Viewed in this light, the Trial
Examiner's premise that the Union could not have accepted
Respondent's management rights proposals without relinquishing its
representative capacity for the contract term is revealed as an
overstatement.
This recent statement of the Board is significant. Inherent in the
reserved rights concept is the notion that management initiates the
change but that the union may react and file a grievance if it feels that
the action was a violation of the agreement. Such a procedure, the
Board now explains, would satisfy the requirements of the Act even in
situations where no waiver permitting management to make the change
unilaterally has been established. The Board points out in Long Lake
Lumber that the opportunity for the union to make proposals post hoc
to cause the management to modify the change that has been initiated
occurs during the discussion in the lower steps of the grievance
procedure.
In addition to the acorns the Board planted during the mid-60's,
which grew into the oaks destroying the typical management clause as
a waiver of bargaining rights and slowing down the rate of productivity
improvement by requiring advance consultation and bargaining, the
Board planted another acorn that is growing into another oak to choke
down the rate of productivity improvement.
This acorn was a new construction of Section 8(d) of the Act." This
section says that, where there is a collective agreement in effect, no
party "shall terminate or modify" it unless a notice is served on the
other party, an offer is made to negotiate, the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service is notified, and the terms and conditions of the
agreement are continued in full force until the expiration date of the
agreement. Section 8(d) quite obviously established the procedures to
be followed when one party was initiating the renegotiation of a labor
contract 6.5 The new construction was placed on Section 8(d) in an
55. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1965).
56. NLRB v. American Nat. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952). See discussions of the purpose of
this section in [Senate Report No. 105 on S. 1126 (80th Cong., 1st Sess.), Legislative History of
the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Gov. Printing Office, Washington, 1948), p. 430]
SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, C. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
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opinion by Trial Examiner Arnold Ordman (currently the General
Counsel) in Adams Dairy.57 Mr. Ordman stated:
By thus eliminating both the work which was the subject-matter of the
collective bargaining contract and the employees who performed that
work, Respondent in the most real sense terminated that contract since
there was no area left in which it could be operative. Without more,
therefore, it appears that Respondent's failure to follow the procedure
prescribed by Section 8(d) as a precondition to such termination
constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(5). I so find.
When an employer acts in a manner that is inconsistent with the
agreement, he cannot be unilaterally changing the agreement. It is
established law that one party to a bilateral contract cannot modify it
by acting inconsistently with it; he can only breach it.58 However,
regardless of the soundness of the Board's interpretation of 8(d), by
construing 8(d) to mean that an employer who acts inconsistently with
an agreement violates that section of the statute, the Board has
catapulted itself into the labor contract enforcement business.
An example of what the Board does with its new interpretation is
found in the first Long Lake Lumber case.59 Since maintenance men
had never before been scheduled to work on Saturdays, the Board
found an "unwritten term of the labor agreement" to the effect that
maintenance men would not be scheduled on Saturday. Since a new
machine was scheduled to operate continuously during the first five
days, it could only be serviced on Saturday unless production was
interrupted. In this case the company could not have the machine
serviced on Saturday even if it bargained the needed change to an
impasse, because under 8(d) the practice of having no machines
serviced on Saturday was construed by the Board to be an unwritten
term of the agreement. Because of political considerations, it is quite
obvious that, after such a determination, the union representatives
would not agree to change the unwritten term of the written agreement.
Hence, the needed maintenance would have to be done during the first
five days, causing a production loss when production was shut down
during the servicing plus the high cost of a standby production crew
which would be idle while the machine was being serviced-clearly a
57 137 N.L.R.B. 815 (1962).
58. Edmondston v. Drake & Mitchel, 32 U.S. (5 Pet.) 103 (1831); Ellman v. Lanni, 2 Ill. App.
2d 353, 157 N.E.2d 807 (1949); VI WILLISTON, CoNrRcTs § 1826 (rev. ed. 1938).
59. 160 N.L.R.B. No. 123 (1966), enforced in part, International Woodworkers of Am. Local
3-10 v. NLRB. 380 F.2d 628 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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result inconsistent with the need for a high rate of plant productivity
improvement.
Not only was the Board, by its construction of 8(d), becoming a rival
to the hundreds of arbitrators in the U.S., but, to the extent it was
saying that past practice becomes an unwritten term of an agreement,
it was generating an even more serious retarding influence on the rate
that management can introduce improvements in productivity than it
did in Fibreboard.11
In connection with this new construction of 8(d) making
management actions inconsistent with a term of the labor agreement
an unfair labor practice, it should be recalled that in one of the early
drafts of the National Labor Relations Act there was a Section 8(a)(6)
which made a breach of a labor agreement an unfair labor practice.
This section was excluded from the law before it was passed and the
Joint Committee report explained the reason:"
Once parties have made a collective bargaining contract, enforcement of
that contract should be left to the usual processes of the law and not to
the National Labor Relations Board.
This meant that arbitrators or courts, and not the Board, should
enforce agreements.62
But, again, all is not lost. This distorted construction of 8(d) appears
to have lost its popularity with the Board. A strong glimmer suggesting
that the Board may work its way out of the grievance arbitration
business is found in Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co.13 There, the Board stated
that it would not exercise jurisdiction in a case in which the union was
claiming that certain changes in relief periods were violations of the
labor agreement and hence violation of the Board's new construction
60. The Board, if it converts custom and practice into labor agreement terms, would be placing
into every labor agreement a provision similar to the famous 2B clause in steel agreements which
continues in effect favorable customs and practices, and generated so much controversy that
efforts to eliminate it prolonged the settlement of the steel strike in 1959 for many months.
61. House Conference Report No. 510 on H.R. 3020, in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, LMRA 545-
46 (1947). H.R. CONG. RP'r. No. 510, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. (1947).
62. The Board's intervention in the labor agreement and enforcement area is contrary to the
national policy to promote arbitration explained by the Supreme Court in the Steelworker Trilogy
cases. United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co. 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
63. 175 N.L.R.B. No. 23 (1969). See Member Brown's concurring opinion in Union Carbide,
178 N.L.R.B. No. 81 (1969), to the effect that where subcontracting is unilaterally challenged
and the employer defends on the basis that negotiation history demonstrates a waiver by the
union, the union should seek its remedy through the grievance procedure.
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of Section 8(d). The Board said the claim that the change in relief
periods was a violation of the labor agreement should be resolved by
submitting a grievance to arbitration under the procedure established
between the parties. Significantly, the Board announced as a general
principle that it would refer unilateral changes to arbitration where (1)
the labor agreement establishes grievance and arbitration machinery,
(2) the employer's unilateral action is not designed to undermine the
union, (3) the employer's action is not patently erroneous, (4) the
employer's action is based on a substantial claim of contractual
privilege, and (5) an arbitration interpretation will resolve both the unfair
labor practice issue and the contract interpretation issue.
It should be noted that the Board did not say in Schlitz "we want
out" of the labor contract enforcement process; it only said it would
defer to the arbitration procedure under certain circumstances. The
Board still assumes it has jurisdiction of grievance claims under 8(d),
which is the same as saying Section 8(a)(6) was not eliminated from
the statute before it was passed by Congress. But at least the Board is
moving back to a better balance between the role of the arbitrator and
the role of the Board. If the Board develops and hardens its policy to
defer to the contractually established arbitration procedure where the
claim involves an allegation of a labor contract violation, as it
announced in Schlitz, the conflict between the Board and arbitration
in the labor contract enforcement area should end.
In summary, to develop the law in a manner compatible with the
objectives of our national labor policy, the Board in its decisional
process should,
(1) avoid shaping the law so as to arbitrarily increase union
bargaining strength, thereby distorting the normal bargaining power
relationship between unions and employers-as such decisions would
merely speed up inflation and harden demands, first for controls and
later for a substitute for the process of free collective bargaining, and
(2) avoid shaping the law so as to retard management's ability to
rapidly initiate the many changes which must occur if productivity
improvement is to be maintained at a rate high enough to cushion the
effect on prices of the annual wage and benefit increases and thereby
permit the standard of living of American workers to rise.
Vol. 1970: 3891
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1970/iss4/1
